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Abstract
This paper presents and argues for an account of objectual understanding that
aims to do justice to the full range of cases of scientific understanding, includ-
ing cases in which one does not have an explanation of the understood phe-
nomenon. According to the proposed account, one understands a phenomenon
just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model of the
ways in which it or its features are situated within a network of dependence re-
lations; one's degree of understanding is proportional to the comprehensiveness
and accuracy of such a model. I compare this account with accounts of scientific
understanding that explicate understanding in terms of having an explanation
of the understood phenomenon. I discuss three distinct types of cases in which
scientific understanding does not amount to possessing an explanation of any
kind, and argue that the proposed model-based account can accommodate these
cases while still retaining a strong link between understanding and explanation.
Keywords: objectual understanding; scientific explanation; non-explanatory
understanding; mental modeling; dependence relations.
1 Introduction
Objectual understanding is a type of cognitive achievement canonically expressed by
sentences of the form `S understands P ', where P is a phenomenon. Understanding-
why, by contrast, is the type of achievement canonically expressed by sentences of
the form `S understands why E', where E is an explanandum (something to be
explained). Understanding why E is clearly closely associated with having an ex-
planation of E, but it is less clear that objectual understanding requires having
or knowing an explanation. While such explanatory accounts of objectual under-
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standing enjoy considerable popularity (e.g., Strevens, 2013; de Regt, 2017; Khalifa,
2017), others have argued that objectual understanding of P does not require that
one has an explanation of any aspect of P (e.g., Lipton, 2009; Kvanvig, 2009; Gijs-
bers, 2013). Two non-explanatory views have gained traction, viz. a manipulationist
account that construes objectual understanding in terms of an ability to manipulate
a representation of P for various purposes (Wilkenfeld, 2013, 2015), and an epistemic
account that construes objectual understanding as an unusually comprehensive type
of propositional knowledge (Kelp, 2015, 2017).
This paper develops and argues for a new account of objectual understanding,
based on the idea that understanding a phenomenon amounts to having a model of
its dependence relations. The account differs from extant non-explanatory accounts
in retaining a crucial insight of explanatory accounts, viz. that understanding con-
sists in locking onto the underlying dependence relations that typically undergird
correct explanations. According to the proposed account, one understands a phe-
nomenon P just in case one grasps a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive model
of the network of dependence relations in which P , or its contextually relevant parts,
is situated; and one's degree of understanding of P is proportional to the comprehen-
siveness and accuracy of such a model. As we will see, it's possible to increase both
the accuracy and the comprehensiveness of such a dependency model of P without
learning an explanation of any aspect of P . Accordingly, this account of understand-
ing accommodates the possibility of achieving understanding through means other
than explanations.
I proceed as follows. I start by clarifying the explicandum, viz. what's called
`objectual understanding' (2), and then present and elaborate on my preferred
model-based account (3). The rest of the paper compares this account with ex-
planatory accounts (defined in 4). In particular, I discuss three types of cases in
which understanding comes apart from explanation, thus illustrating the limitations
of explanatory accounts (5-7). For each type of case, I show how the model-based
account I favor allows us to attribute understanding to the agent, thus delivering
the more plausible verdict about such cases. I conclude with a brief discussion of
how the key insight of explanatory accounts  that understanding is closely related
to explanation  can be accommodated within a plausible non-explanatory account
(8).
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2 Objectual Understanding
The topic of this paper is the type of understanding that is canonically attributed to
someone with a sentence of the form `S understands P ', where P is a phenomenon.
This type of understanding is usually referred to as objectual understanding. The
term is slightly misleading since the target phenomenon P need not be a single
object; rather, it may be a complex system that is itself most naturally described as
being composed of several interacting objects. Thus, for example, one can be said
to understand complex systems like machines, economies, and human minds  all of
which are naturally thought of as systems with interacting parts. In using the term
`phenomenon' for the target of objectual understanding, I do not mean to imply that
these targets must be observational or empirical. Atoms, quarks, and electric fields
can be understood, even though they cannot be (directly) observed. Indeed, I take
it that everything that exists is, or is part of, some phenomenon or other  and can
thus conceivably be the target of someone's understanding in the relevant sense.
I am following Kelp (2015, 2017) in characterizing objectual understanding as
understanding of phenomena. Some have instead characterized objectual under-
standing as understanding of a `topic' (Brun and Baumberger, 2017) or `subject
matter' (Carter and Gordon, 2016; Khalifa, 2017). However, that encourages the
slip from understanding something to understanding a discipline that studies it, as
in `she understands quantum physics'. Since a discipline could afford a very poor
understanding of the phenomena it studies (as in the case of alchemy, for example),
this distinction should not be overlooked. For similar reasons, it is important to
distinguish objectual understanding from understanding of theories  what Newman
(2017) helpfully calls `theoretical understanding.' After all, it is one thing to under-
stand a phenomenon itself and quite another to understand the theories that may or
may not be true of those phenomena. For example, I can have perfect understanding
of the phlogiston theory of heat, but that gives me a limited understanding of heat
itself (since the theory is radically false).1
Objectual understanding is often contrasted with the type of understanding that
is canonically attributed to someone with a sentence of the form `S understands why
1With that said, understanding of theories may or may not be a necessary requirement, or
perhaps a species of, objectual understanding. For reasons of space, I won't discuss the relation
between objectual understanding and understanding of theories further in this paper.
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E', where E describes an explanandum.2 This is known as understanding-why  or
sometimes, since having understanding of this kind clearly involves having or knowing
an explanation, explanatory understanding. Although much of the recent philosophi-
cal enthusiasm about understanding has explicitly concerned this kind of understand-
ing (e.g., Hills, 2009, 2016; Pritchard, 2009, 2010; Grimm, 2010, 2012, 2014), it's also
clear that understanding-why has already received a great deal of attention in the
literature on scientific explanation and explanation-seeking why-questions. Thus, if
understanding-why is the only kind of understanding that is of philosophical inter-
est, or if other kinds of understanding can be reduced to understanding-why without
loss (as is argued by Khalifa, 2013a), then the topic of understanding may not be
as novel or interesting as many epistemologists and philosophers of science have
suggested (see esp. Khalifa, 2012, 2017). This paper in effect pushes back against
attempts to reduce objectual understanding to understanding-why by arguing that,
in contrast to understanding-why, objectual understanding does not necessarily in-
volve having or knowing an explanation of the understood phenomenon or any of its
features.
Let me highlight two further features of (objectual) understanding3 that matter
to my arguments below. First, understanding is a matter of degree in a way that
propositional knowledge, for example, is not. It's not just that one can understand
more or fewer phenomena; rather, one can have more and less (or, if you prefer,
`better' and `worse') understanding of a single phenomenon P . Thus it makes sense
to say, for example, that an experienced physicist has a greater understanding of
Brownian motion than her graduate student; who in turn has a greater understand-
ing of this phenomenon than the freshmen taking her introductory courses; and so
forth. A corollary of this gradability of understanding is that our understanding of
a phenomenon can (and typically does) improve incrementally over time. Second, I
will assume that paradigmatic cases of understanding are to be found in the natural
sciences  thus, what follows can be viewed as a discussion of scientific understand-
ing. Importantly, this means that a central adequacy condition for an account of
understanding is that it makes sense of how understanding is in fact achieved in the
2Objectual understanding should also be distinguished from linguistic understanding, e.g. un-
derstanding a sentence in a particular language (see Longworth, 2009). Furthermore, it is unclear
whether objectual understanding is the type of understanding one can have of other persons (see
Grimm, 2016). Since my concern is with understanding in natural science, I don't take a stand on
that issue here.
3From now on, I will often omit `objectual' from `objectual understanding' to save space. To
prevent misunderstandings, I will not do this for `understanding-why'.
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empirical sciences.4
3 Understanding as Dependency Modeling
The account of understanding that I propose holds that to understand a phenomenon
is to grasp a specific kind of model of that phenomenon's dependence relations. I
will develop this dependency modeling account of understanding in stages, starting
with the term `model'.
For my purposes, a model is simply an information structure of some kind that
is interpreted so as to represent its target. These information structures can be
concrete, as in Watson and Crick's original model of DNA, or abstract, as in math-
ematical and computational models like the Lotka-Volterra model of predation in
ecological systems. In both cases, the structures are associated with an intended
interpretation that specifies how the different parts of the structure correspond to
different elements and relations in the phenomenon  a `key' (Frigg and Nguyen,
2016). In the Lotka-Volterra model, for example, its differential equations contain
variables that are meant to correspond to determinables of the real system, such as
the sizes of the predator and prey populations. Note that these equations are not
themselves a model; rather, they become part of a model once the variables therein
have been interpreted.5 The same is true for other information structures  they be-
come a model only once different parts of the structures have been associated with
specific parts of the phenomenon in question.
Now, since understanding is something that happens in our minds, a model-based
account of understanding requires that the relevant kind of models must somehow be
present in thought. There is indeed an influential, though somewhat non-standard,
psychological account of mental representation which holds that agents construct
so-called `mental models' to use in reasoning and deliberation (Craik, 1943; Johnson-
Laird, 1983, 2013; Nersessian, 2007; Thagard, 2010). Some theorists even propose
to replace the traditional picture of the mind as occupied by propositional attitudes,
with a picture on which thought is based on mental models (Waskan, 2006). However,
4Indeed, understanding is arguably an important cognitive aim of science (Potochnik, 2015, 2017;
de Regt, 2017), and scientific progress at least sometimes consists in increasing understanding of
natural phenomena (Bangu, 2015; Dellsén, 2016; Stuart, 2016).
5Here I am roughly following Weisberg (2013) in thinking of models as interpreted structures. I
should note that the kind of modeling I have in mind is what Weisberg refers to as `target-directed
modeling' (Weisberg, 2013, esp. ch. 5).
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it is ultimately an empirical question whether the mind should be thought of as
containing such models (in addition to, or instead of, propositional attitudes), and I
would prefer to stay neutral on this issue. Fortunately, as far as the current account
of understanding is concerned, all that's required is that models can be represented
in the mind, e.g. by sets of propositions that describe these models. As a shorthand
for the relation between the mind and the models  whatever it turns out to be 
I will use the term `grasp'.6 Thus we can say that, on the model-based account
I have in mind, understanding consists of grasping a certain kind of model of the
understood phenomenon.
What kind of model must an understanding agent grasp? By their nature, all
models are incomplete or inaccurate representations of their targets. As Borges's
On Exactitude in Science famously illustrated, only an exact copy of something
can represent all its aspects in an accurate way. So which aspects of a phenomenon
must be represented by an understanding agent's model? My answer to this ques-
tion is inspired by previous and related work on understanding, which connects
understanding-why with dependence relations (Kim, 1974; Greco, 2014; Grimm,
2014).7 Building on this idea, I say that the aspects of a phenomenon that matter
for understanding are the dependence relations that the phenomenon, or its features,
stands in towards other things. The most well-known kind of dependence relation
is causality  an effect depends on its cause  but there are arguably other kinds of
dependence relations as well. One of these arguably non-causal dependence relations
is grounding  i.e., the in-virtue-of relation (Fine, 2001; Schaffer, 2009; Audi, 2012).
There might very well be other non-causal dependency relations that do not reduce
to either causation or ground, e.g. the relation between a foundational mathemat-
ical axiom and a theorem it explains (see, e.g., Steiner, 1978), the kind of relation
there is between Socrates's death and the widowing of Xanthippa (Kim, 1974), or
the kind of relation there is between the curvature of space time and the shape of
an undisturbed electron cloud traveling through that space (Nerlich, 1976). At any
6I am not alone in using the term `grasp' as a placeholder for a relation constitutive of un-
derstanding that remains to be further specified (see, e.g., Strevens, 2013, 511-512). See Bourget
(2015) for a systematic discussion of the relevant notion of `grasping'.
7With that said, the position developed in this paper differs from previous accounts of under-
standing in terms of dependence relations in showing why and how objectual understanding can
come apart from having an explanation (see 5-7). Indeed, this possibility would seem to be ex-
cluded by both Greco and Grimm, who construe understanding as knowledge of causes (where
`cause' is defined broadly so as to include grounds and other factors on which something might de-
pend). After all, someone who possesses knowledge of the kind required by these accounts would
seem to have an explanation of the understood phenomenon or its relevant features.
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rate, the kind of model that I think is involved in understanding is one that aims to
capture the network of dependence relations that a phenomenon stands in, whatever
these relations turn out to be. I will refer to this as a dependency model.
To get a sense of what I mean by a dependency model, consider causal graphs (also
known as `causal maps'). Causal graphs are pictorial representations of models that
are meant to capture the causal relations in some given system. Specifically, they
purport to tell us which elements of the system are causes and effects of which other
elements, and also which elements are not either causes or effects of specific other
elements. In other words, they are meant to contain both `positive' information
about the causal relations that are present within a system, and also `negative'
information about which parts of the system are not causally related. Now, since
causal graphs are only concerned with one kind of dependence relation, they can only
afford a partial understanding of the target phenomenon (and, of course, they do so
only when the agent has indeed grasped the model depicted by the graph). However,
it's easy to see how a more complete model can be constructed by representing other
dependence relations, such as grounding. Thus a pictorial representation of what I
am calling a dependency model would be a graph which purports to depict how each
element depends, or does not depend, on each other element  causally or otherwise.
Of course, to have understanding of a phenomenon P , it is not enough to grasp
any old dependency model of P . Rather, the model must in some sense be a good
representation of the relevant dependence relations. So what makes such a model
better or worse qua representation? My answer is simple: A dependency model
better represents P to the extent that the network of dependence relations that
P stands in is correctly depicted by the model. Since a dependency model can
thus fail either by incorrectly representing (i.e. misrepresenting) some aspect of this
network, or by not representing it at all, we can identify two separate criteria here,
viz. accuracy and comprehensiveness. These two criteria can come into conflict:
Increasing comprehensiveness may require us to to sacrifice accuracy, in which case
we engage in a kind of idealization; conversely, to increase accuracy we may have
to sacrifice our model's comprehensiveness, in which case we engage in abstraction.
Since understanding is a function of how well a model does on both accuracy and
comprehensiveness at once, it is sometimes possible to increase one's understanding
by sacrificing either accuracy or comprehensiveness respectively, provided that doing
so brings sufficient benefits with regard to the other criterion. Incidentally, this helps
to explain why idealizations and abstractions can both increase understanding.
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I have noted that understanding is a gradable notion  that one can have various
degrees of understanding of the same phenomenon. In a model-based account of
the sort I am proposing, this is explained by the fact that the two aforementioned
criteria (accuracy and comprehensiveness) are both gradable.8 Thus one's degree
of understanding of some phenomenon P is proportional to the comprehensiveness
and accuracy of one's dependency model of P . Of course, we commonly use the
term `understanding' in what seems to be a binary way. Such a binary concept of
understanding can be explicated in terms of a degree of understanding that exceeds
some threshold t, where the t is presumably contextually-determined (e.g. by the
speaker's context of utterance).9 Thus when someone says `S understands P ', we
can take that to mean that S has a degree of understanding that is higher than
such a threshold t, i.e. that S grasps a model of P that is sufficiently accurate
and comprehensive to exceed the thresholds determined by the speaker's context of
utterance.
Context also enters into our usage of the term `understanding' in a couple of other
ways. First, context plausibly determines which parts of a complex phenomenon need
to be understood to a significant degree in order for it to be felicitous to say that the
phenomenon itself is understood. For example, what it means to understand human
mating will differ substantially depending on whether one is speaking to a physician,
a psychologist or an ecologist. Relatedly, context plausibly determines which other
phenomena (or parts thereof) are sufficiently salient for their dependence relations
to the target phenomenon P , or lack thereof, to be relevant to whether someone
understands P . For example, most events will have enormous causal histories tracing
back to the beginning of the universe, but only a small subset of the causes will be
sufficiently salient in a given context for one's dependency model to contribute more
understanding of such events if one correctly represents the dependence relation
between the events and the relevant cause. Similarly, only a small subset of the
phenomena that a given target phenomenon P does not stand in a dependence
relation towards will be sufficiently salient in a given context for the lack of such a
8Additionally, the gradability of understanding can be explained by the gradability of `grasping',
i.e. by the fact that one can have a stronger or weaker grasp of the dependency model in question.
I won't discuss this feature further in this paper, since I am not focusing here on the psychological
aspects of understanding.
9The context-sensitivity of understanding is also discussed by Wilkenfeld (2013, 1007-9) and
Kelp (2015, 3813-14)
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relation to contribute anything to one's understanding of P .10
With these points in mind, the dependency modeling account of understanding I
am proposing  DMA, for short  can be summarized as follows:
DMA: S understands a phenomenon P if and only if S grasps a sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive dependency model of P (or its contextually relevant
parts); S's degree of understanding of P is proportional to the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of that dependency model of P (or its contextually relevant
parts).
Since dependence relations are, at least normally, what undergirds explanations,
there is still a strong connection between understanding and explanation on this
view. So there is a kernel of truth in explanatory accounts of objectual understand-
ing. However, whereas explanatory accounts take explanation to be a necessary
component of such understanding, the current account allows for understanding to
come apart from explanation. We will examine a number of cases that illustrate this
in various ways below  cases that support DMA and undermine any account that
makes explanation a requirement for understanding.11
4 Explanatory Accounts
Having sketched my dependency modelling account (DMA) of objectual understand-
ing, I now turn a class of accounts that I will take as my main target in this paper,
viz. explanatory accounts. Roughly speaking, an explanatory account of understand-
ing takes explanation to be a necessary condition on understanding. A particularly
clear example of an explanatory account is Strevens's `simple view', where having a
10For example, there is almost no imaginable circumstances in which the number of grains of sand
on one of the Maldives Islands is salient in the context of understanding the 2016 US presidential
election. That is why grasping the independence between the two phenomena would almost never
constitute any degree of understanding of the 2016 US presidential election. I say `almost never'
because it is possible to force the number of grains of sand on one of the Maldives Islands to become
salient, e.g. if the number of grains of sand on the Maldives Islands were (for whatever strange
reason) known to have been a significant causal factor in the previous (i.e. 2012) US presidential
election. In that case, grasping the independence between the numbers of grains of sand and the
2016 elections would indeed constitute some understanding of the 2016 elections. (Thanks to a
reviewer for pressing me to clarify my account in response to this example.)
11I lack the space here to discuss other non-explanatory accounts of objectual understanding, such
as Wilkenfeld's (2013; 2015) manipulationist account and Kelp's (2015; 2017) epistemic account.
However, it should be clear that these accounts differ from the current account since DMA does
not define understanding in terms of manipulability or knowledge.
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correct explanation is taken to be both necessary and sufficient for understanding:
An individual has scientific understanding of a phenomenon just in case
they grasp a correct scientific explanation of that phenomenon (Strevens,
2013, 510).12
However, I will also classify as explanatory a wide range of accounts that posit a less
tight connection between explanation and understanding. These include accounts
on which there are non-explanatory requirements for understanding, so that having
or grasping an explanation is not sufficient for understanding. They also include ac-
counts on which the explanations need not be correct, but instead merely `adequate'
in some broader sense (e.g. empirically adequate, or well-confirmed by scientific
evidence).
To make this demarcation between explanatory and non-explanatory accounts
more precise, I will count as explanatory any account of understanding that satisfies
the following condition:
U→E: S understands P only if S grasps enough of an adequate explanation of
P (or its relevant features); other things being equal, S has more understanding
of P to the extent that S grasps more of an adequate explanation of P (or its
relevant features).
This requirement is accepted by many  probably most  philosophers who have
written about scientific understanding and explanation (e.g., Salmon, 1993; Nounou
and Psillos, 2012; Khalifa, 2012, 2013a, 2017; Strevens, 2013; de Regt, 2017; de Regt
and Gijsbers, 2016). Indeed, U→E is even accepted by some who do not particularly
highlight the role of explanation in understanding, but who nevertheless make ex-
planation a necessary condition on understanding. Consider, for example, de Regt's
most recent account of scientific understanding:
A phenomenon P is understood scientifically if and only if there is an
explanation of P that is based on an intelligible theory T and conforms to
the basic epistemic values of empirical adequacy and internal consistency
(de Regt, 2017, 92).
12Given that this is meant to specify when someone has understanding of a phenomenon (rather
than, e.g. when someone understands why something is the case), I take this to be an account of
objectual understanding rather than (or perhaps in addition to) an account of understanding-why.
To be fair, however, Strevens does not discuss the distinction between objectual understanding and
understanding-why.
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While the focus of de Regt's work has largely been to develop and defend his account
of understanding as involving intelligibility and conformism to empirical adequacy
and consistency (as opposed to truth), his account is clearly explanatory in the sense
of making explanation a necessary requirement for understanding (as per U→E).
One might even wonder whether my own account of understanding  DMA 
satisfies U→E and thus counts as an explanatory account by these lights. There is
some truth in this thought, since a dependency model typically contains the kind of
information that can be used in adequate explanations, such as information about
causal relations. But in order for DMA to count as explanatory by the lights of U→E,
it would have to be the case that any information about a phenomenon's dependency
relations would also be part of an explanation for the phenomenon (or its relevant
features). Below I discuss various cases in which that is not so. To foreshadow, this is
roughly because the information about dependence-relations that serves to increase
our understanding in these cases consists of, or implies, the fact that the understood
phenomenon cannot be explained  either by some specific other fact, or at all.
The upshot, then, will be that it's possible to gain understanding of a phenomenon
without gaining any information that would serve to explain that phenomenon or
its relevant features.
In what follows, I discuss three distinct ways in which U→E fails. In each case,
scientists gain understanding of a phenomenon without obtaining any information
that would serve to explain that phenomenon (or its relevant features). I will argue
that DMA can easily account for cases of these types without invoking any additional
theoretical machinery. By contrast, explanatory accounts can at best attempt to
explain away these types of cases by adding theoretical baggage that brings its own
set of problems for these accounts. So while the types of cases I discuss below do
not conclusively refute explanatory accounts of understanding, I do maintain that
they shift the overall argumentative burden so as to favor non-explanatory accounts
such as DMA.
5 Explanatory Bruteness
The first type of cases in which U→E fails involves what I will call explanatory
bruteness. These are phenomena that have no explanation at all  phenomena that
are not merely unexplained, but unexplainable.
An interesting subset of the kind of cases I am interested in here has previously
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been discussed by Kvanvig (2009) in the context of arguing against a reduction of
objectual understanding to understanding-why. Kvanvig asks us to imagine a system
in which it is indeterminate whether an electron will go to the left or to the right,
with an equal chance of each option materializing. Kvanvig says that the path of the
electron cannot be explained in such a system, since its path will by construction be
the result of chance rather than of causation (Kvanvig, 2009, 101). I agree with
Kvanvig on this point, but a fuller discussion of the example would need to include
a story of how exactly the system is understood.13 I believe DMA provides exactly
that story: The dependence relations in an indeterministic system can be modeled,
no less than those in a deterministic system. Thus, if we grasp the appropriate kind
of model, i.e. a sufficiently accurate and comprehensive dependency model, then we
understand it. Importantly, note that a model is more comprehensive if it includes
rather than excludes the information that the electron's going right rather than left
is a 50-50 chance event, the outcome of which does not depend on anything else in
the system. Thus gaining this crucial information increases one's understanding of
the system according to DMA.
So in my view, Kvanvig's example provides a nice illustration of the benefits
of DMA over explanatory accounts. However, the dialectical potency of Kvanvig's
example has been contested at length by Khalifa (2013a), who argues that the elec-
tron's going left rather than right can in fact be explained after all. Khalifa's line of
argument starts by pointing out that the non-contrastive fact that the electron went
to the left can be explained probabilistically according to some influential theories
of probabilistic explanation, such as Railton's (1978; 1981). Khalifa further argues
that even the contrastive fact that the electron went left rather than right can be
explained in the same way. This is implausible on its face, since explaining a con-
trastive fact  that A rather than B  seems to require an explanans that makes A
more likely to occur than B, and by stipulation there is no such explanation in the
present case. But Khalifa responds that this
[...] confuses the source of explanatory relevance or difference making. An
explanation needn't make the probabilities between contrasted outcomes
different from each other; rather, these probabilities must be different
than they would be had the explanans been different (Khalifa, 2013a,
13Kvanvig is surprisingly silent on this point, though he does say of understanding generally
that it involves having a grasp of the structural relationships (e.g. logical, probabilistic, and
explanatory relationships) between the central items of information regarding which the question
of understanding arises (Kvanvig, 2009, 97).
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1163).
But I see no confusion here, for the claim that the probabilities for different outcomes
in contrastive indeterministic explanations must be different is perfectly compatible
with the claim that an explanans must make a difference to (i.e. raise or lower) the
probabilities of the outcomes. Indeed, some of the most influential discussions of
contrastive explanations, such as Sober (1984) and van Fraassen (1980), explicitly
make the stronger requirement that such explanations must make the explanandum
more probable than the alternatives in the relevant contrast class.
Moreover, I don't think Khalifa's defense generalizes to understanding of other
indeterministic systems. Consider a modification of Kvanvig's example in which
there is a much greater (e.g., a trillion times greater) chance that the electron goes
right than left; nevertheless, the electron went left. By the same token as before,
the system can be understood. But can the fact that the electron went left (rather
than right) be explained? Such an explanation would have to reveal how extremely
unlikely the electron is to have gone left, thus making the event even more surprising
than it would have seemed before. But such a small probability, if it can be said
to explain at all, surely provides a worse explanation than a larger counterpart.
This is not just `intuitively' so, but also strongly suggested by scientific practice 
in particular, by statistical mechanics  in which conveying a larger probability on
events is taken to provide a better explanation for those events (Strevens, 2000). So in
this modified Kvanvig-style case we would at best have an extremely poor explanation
for the electron's trajectory. Contrary to Khalifa (2013b, 169), understanding thus
clearly cannot be identified with having a reasonably good explanation.14 And of
course it is even less plausible that the contrastive fact that the electron went left
rather than right can be adequately explained by citing a probability that so strongly
favors the contrasting event over the explanandum.
Proponents of explanatory accounts of understanding could of course simply insist
that the relevant (contrastive) outcomes can be adequately explained after all. But
this raises the issue of what exactly is required for indeterministic (contrastive)
explanation by their lights. As we have seen, Khalifa is explicit on this point, saying
that the probabilities [of contrasted outcomes] must be different than they would
be had the explanans been different (Khalifa, 2013a, 1163). Specifically, Khalifa
14In his most recent work, Khalifa (2017) does not explicitly talk about reasonably good expla-
nations, though he does say that the kind of understanding he views as fundamental  explanatory
understanding  is characteristic of good explanations (Khalifa, 2017, 2).
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appeals to Hitchcock's (1999, 587) account of contrastive indeterministic explanation,
which holds that A is `explanatorily relevant'15 to the contrastive outcome that E
rather than F , relative to background conditions B, just in case:
P
(
E|(A&B)&(E ∨ F )) 6= P (E|B&(E ∨ F )).
This is an extremely liberal conception of contrastive explanatory relevance; it counts
A as explanatorily relevant to E rather than F if there is any change in the prob-
ability of E when we conditionalize on A  including a lowering of this probability.
Nevertheless, let us grant it for the sake of the argument. The question is whether
this conception makes it impossible to construct Kvanvig-style cases in which under-
standing comes apart from explanation (or explanatory relevance).
It does not, for Kvanvig's case can be modified so that the probabilities of the con-
trasted outcomes are the same before and after conditionalizing on A. For instance,
consider a variant on Kvanvig's original case in which (it is part of the background
conditions B that) the electron either goes through the original indeterministic pro-
cess16 (whatever that process was) or, alternatively, goes through another indeter-
ministic process for which the probabilities of the electron going left and right are
exactly the same as in the first process.17 So, for example, if there was an equal
chance of the electron going left rather than right in the first process, then there is
also an equal chance of these two events in the second process. Now, in such a case,
the information that the electron went through the first process, for instance, would
not be explanatorily relevant to the electron going left rather than right according
to Hitchcock's criterion, since the probability of the event would not change at all
when we conditionalize on this information.18 Nevertheless, by the same token as
before, it would surely increase our understanding of the event to find out which of
15I will set aside the fact that Hitchcock's condition is meant to explicate what it is for something
to be `explanatorily relevant', not what it is for something to explain something else.
16In using the term `process', I do not mean to assume that later events in the process depend
on earlier events (as an effect depends on its cause). Indeed, for my purposes here, `process' can be
replaced with `sequence of events (which may or may not depend on each other)'.
17It can be assumed that it is itself indeterministic whether the electron goes through the first
or the second process, although I don't think that is necessary for the case to work as it should.
18Let A be the claim that the electron went through the first process; and let E and F be the
claims that the electron went left and right respectively. Given our background conditions B, ¬A
is equivalent to the claim that the electron went through the second process. By construction, our
case is such that:
P
(
E|(A&B)&(E ∨ F )) = P (E|(¬A&B)&(E ∨ F )).
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the two indeterministic processes the electron actually went through.
So I have my doubts about Khalifa's response to Kvanvig's example of under-
standing of indeterministic systems. However, I will now set these doubts aside,
because I believe that an argument similar to Kvanvig's can be made by appealing
to cases that do not in involve any indeterminacy. What I have in mind are explana-
torily brute facts  facts that aren't merely currently unexplained, but for which
there is no (correct) explanation, deterministic or otherwise.19 There are numerous
plausible candidates for such explanatorily brute facts, ranging from various mun-
dane coincidences to fundamental physical truths (for some examples, see Owens,
1992; Barnes, 1994; Fahrbach, 2005; Lando, 2017). For any such fact, there is a
phenomenon that is better understood if one's representation of the phenomenon
includes a depiction of the very fact that makes it unexplainable, viz. that its oc-
currence or existence does not depend on anything else. Any such case undermines
U→E. Indeed, note that in so far as we are seeking an account of understanding
that is not merely extensionally adequate in the actual world, but is also adequate
to counterfactual scenarios (such as when we ask whether a a given false theory, e.g.
the phlogiston theory of combustion, would have provided scientific understanding if
it were true), we have here an argument against explanatory accounts if it is merely
possible that there are explanatorily brute facts.20
Of course, it is very much an unsettled empirical question whether a given fact is
explanatorily brute. However, just for illustrative purposes, consider what physicists
often consider to be a plausible candidate for explanatorily brute facts, viz. the
values of the dimensionless fundamental physical constants. These are constants that
play an indispensible role in fundamental physical theory and whose values cannot
themselves be explained by any currently accepted scientific theory. Accordingly,
the only known way to determine the values of these constants is via measurement.
Fortunately, since these constants are dimensionless, their values are the same in
Using Bayes's Theorem, it is easy to prove that this entails:
P
(
E|(A&B)&(E ∨ F )) = P (E|B&(E ∨ F )),
which negates Hitchcock's criterion.
19Barnes (1994, 62) refers to facts of this kind as ontologically brute.
20I don't see any reason to reject the possibility of explanatorily brute facts, except perhaps on
the grounds of some sort of a priori commitment to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). While
I suppose proponents of explanatory accounts could avoid the argument of this section by claiming
that the PSR is (necessarily) true, that would be a very high price to pay for avoiding just one of
three arguments against U→E.
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any system of measurement. For example, one such constant is the electromagnetic
coupling constant (also known as the `fine structure constant'), α ≈ 1/137, which
describes the strength of electromagnetic forces in our universe. Now, suppose there
is no (correct) explanation for this value  that the value of α is explanatorily brute.21
If so, it seems clear that we can increase our understanding of a number of phenomena
 most obviously, of electromagnetic interactions  by discovering that this is the
case. To see this most clearly, contrast a scientist (or a scientific community) who
has made this discovery with one who is mistaken or in the dark about whether the
value of the electromagnetic coupling constant can be explained. Clearly, the latter's
understanding of electromagnetic interactions is wanting or defective in a way that
the former's is not.
So brute facts are a problem for explanatory accounts of understanding. Admit-
tedly, they do not constitute a knock-down argument against explanatory accounts,
since their proponents can always bite the bullet and deny us understanding in these
cases. At the very least, however, explanatorily brute facts count in favor of the non-
explanatory account proposed here, DMA, as against its explanatory counterparts.
After all, note that in cases of explanatorily brute facts, understanding comes from
realizing that the phenomenon in question is not caused, grounded, or otherwise
dependent on anything else. Such cases are easily accommodated by DMA, since a
dependency model that depicts such a phenomenon or its features as not dependent
on anything else would be more accurate than an otherwise identical model that
represents them as dependent on something else, and more comprehensive than an
otherwise identical model that abstracts away from the issue. Indeterministic sys-
tems of the kind discussed by Kvanvig (2009) and Khalifa (2013a) are a special case
of this type: In such systems, the explanatorily brute feature is an outcome of an
indeterministic chance process, such as the electron's going left rather than right.
This outcome is not dependent on anything else in the system, even if the outcome's
probability of occurring clearly is.
6 Explanatory Targetedness
I turn now to a second class of cases in which understanding comes apart from
explanation. In these cases, we come to understand through grasping an explanation,
21Given the current state of physical theory, this may well be true; although again I emphasize
that it is an open empirical question and one that may never be settled with certainty.
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but the explanation helps us understand the explanans rather than the explanandum.
Thus, in these cases, the target of one's understanding differs from the target of one's
explanation in a way that separates understanding of P from grasping an explanation
of P .
As a case in point, consider the transition from Rutherford's planetary model of
the atom to Bohr's quasi-quantum model. In both models, the atom is depicted as
consisting of negatively charged electrons that orbit a positively charged nucleus.
But whereas Rutherford's model did not specify what possible locations and energy
levels the electrons could occupy, Bohr proposed that the orbits of the electrons had
certain fixed radii associated with specific energy levels. Of course, Bohr's model is
not entirely accurate by our lights, since the contemporary fully quantum mechani-
cal model of the atom depicts the electrons as spread out in a probabilistic electron
cloud, not as located on orbits with fixed radii. Nevertheless, since the fully quan-
tum mechanical model does imply that the electron cloud is densest around Bohr's
orbitals  in the sense that electrons are most likely to be found near these orbitals 
Bohr's model is reasonably accurate by the lights of contemporary physical theory.
Thus it certainly seems right to say that Bohr's model increased our understanding
of the atom as compared with Rutherford's previous model.
Now, Bohr's model certainly contained a great deal of explanatory information.
Consider what is perhaps the most striking explanatory achievement of Bohr's model,
viz. the explanation of the Rydberg formula for spectral lines of several chemical el-
ements, such as hydrogen. A crucial part of this explanation is the assumption, built
into Bohr's model, that electrons would have to be located on fixed orbits around
the nucleus. Given this, an electron can only gain or lose energy in fixed discrete
quantities (when it `jumps' between orbitals), which explains why the radiation from
each atom has certain fixed wavelengths, viz. those described by Rydberg's formula.
So Bohr's model provides a reasonably correct explanation for the wavelengths de-
scribed by Rydberg's formula. Moreover, this explanation could not have been made
using Rutherford's model, since the latter does not specify that the electron orbits
should have fixed radii. Thus, one might think, explanatory accounts of understand-
ing can account for how the transition from Rutherford's model to Bohr's increased
our understanding of the atom.
But this tempting line of thought is mistaken. To see why, note that the spectral
patterns described by Rydberg's formula are not a feature of any atom, but a feature
of the radiation that's omitted from such atoms. So the phenomenon that is being
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explained in the above explanation  the explanandum  is not a feature of the
atoms as described by Bohr's model at all. It's true that a feature attributed to
the atom by Bohr's model, viz. the fact that the electron orbits have fixed radii,
occurs in this explanation. But this feature serves not as the explanandum but as
part of the explanans. So while Bohr improved our understanding of the atom with
his explanation of the Rydberg formula, he did not thereby explain the atom or its
relevant features. Nor did Bohr provide some other explanation for the atom or it's
relevant features, such as for the stipulation that the electron orbits had fixed radii;
rather, these features are simply posited by the model. What Bohr's understanding
of the atom allowed him to do, explanation-wise, was to increase our capacity to
explain other related phenomena, viz. the atoms' spectral patterns. But that point
is neither here nor there with regard to U→E, which would require that Bohr had
some explanation of the the atom itself.
Now consider this episode from the point of view of my dependency modeling
account of understanding, DMA. Here the question is not whether Bohr managed to
explain any specific feature of the atom, but whether Bohr's model provided a more
accurate and/or comprehensive model of the network of dependence relations that
the atom, or its features, stand in towards other things. Bohr's model, in contrast to
Rutherford's, reveals that the spectral patterns described by Rydberg's formula are
caused by radiation emission in fixed quantities corresponding to the fixed radii of
the electrons' orbits. Thus the transition from Rutherford's model to Bohr's provides
a more comprehensive model of the dependence relations in which the atom stands
towards spectral lines. In this way, DMA validates the judgment that Bohr's model
really did increase our understanding of the atom, despite the fact that the model
did not provide an explanation of any of the atom's features.
By contrast, explanatory accounts would have to demote Bohr's achievement to
something less than an increased understanding of the atom, such as to a mere de-
scription of the atom, or to an increased understanding of spectral patterns (and not
also of the atom itself). This has to be considered a significant cost of accepting
explanatory accounts, for Bohr's model is frequently described in terms of an un-
derstanding of the atom in scientific practice. For example, a widely used textbook
describes Bohr's achievements by noting that even though his model later proved
to be incorrect, Bohr remained a central figure in the drive to understand the atom
(Zumdahl and DeCoste, 2010, 331). The most natural interpretation is surely that
Bohr is taken to have advanced our understanding of atoms, albeit to a non-maximal
degree. Of course, this is not a knock-down argument for DMA as against explana-
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tory accounts by any stretch, since proponents of the latter may reinterpret such
statements in line with their accounts, or simply reject them as confused. However,
DMA has the advantage over explanatory accounts in that it does not require re-
jecting or reinterpreting statements that seemingly attribute to Bohr some degree of
understanding of the atom.
I conclude that, in some cases, understanding of a phenomenon plausibly does
not come from enabling us to explain that phenomenon (or its features), but in mod-
eling the phenomenon in a way that enables us to explain other phenomena. There
is a broader lesson in the vicinity here. Explanatory accounts of understanding can
seem plausible, perhaps even irresistible, because understanding does tend to bring
increased capacities to explain. In that sense, explanation and understanding are
indeed closely linked. However, at least in some cases, the targets of understanding
and the associated explanation are not the same, for the understood phenomenon (or
its features) sometimes functions as the explanans, not as the explanandum. This
crucial difference is sometimes forgotten when understanding is simply associated
with `explanatory information'  as if there was some special sort of information
that's eligible for explanatory work. In truth, any piece of information can be used
in an explanation, and so any information is `explanatory' in the right context.
What matters for the purposes of evaluating explanatory accounts is whether the
understanding-increasing piece of information is part of an explanation of the phe-
nomenon that is being understood. I have argued that this is not always so.
7 Explanatory Disconnectedness
A third and final type of case in which understanding comes apart from explanation
is when our understanding is increased by virtue of discovering that some object or
feature does not explain another object or feature. This is illustrated by a version
of an example that Lipton (2009) introduced into the debate, viz. Galileo's reductio
22It is worth noting that Lipton himself and many of his interlocutors who defend explanatory
accounts (e.g., Khalifa, 2012, 2017) are primarily concerned with what this example tells us about
understanding-why. In particular, Lipton argues that the example shows that understanding-why
can come apart from explanation, while Khalifa objects that Lipton has failed to establish this. In
contrast to Lipton, my use of this example is only meant to illustrate that objectual understanding
can come apart from explanation. Indeed, as I note in the next footnote, I disagree with Lipton that
the example illustrates that understanding-why can come apart from explanation as well. Thus,
for me, Galileo's reductio exemplifies an important difference between objectual understanding and
understanding-why, viz. that the former can come apart from explanation in cases of this sort while
the latter cannot.
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of the idea that heavier objects have greater gravitational acceleration than lighter
objects.22 As Lipton presents it, the reductio is a thought experiment in which
we suppose that a lighter object is fastened to a heavier object. If lighter objects
accelerate slower, then the lighter object should slow down the heavier object, so
the two objects should accelerate slower than the heavier object would by itself.
However, the two objects can also be considered together as one larger object, which
is thus heavier than either of the objects that it is composed of, so this composite
object should accelerate faster than the heavier object. But since the two objects
cannot both accelerate faster and slower than the heavier object would by itself, the
idea that heavier objects accelerate faster than lighter objects cannot be correct.
Lipton claims that Galileo's reductio provides understanding even though it is not
an explanation. I agree with Lipton that the reductio provides us with understanding,
but I don't accept Lipton's analysis of why it provides understanding.23 According
to Lipton, the reductio reveals a specific kind of necessity:
Galileo's thought experiment is a wonderful demonstration of the neces-
sity of the mass independence of gravitational acceleration and, since
seeing necessity is one form of understanding, it is a source of under-
standing [...] (Lipton, 2009, 48).
However, I fail to see how the necessity of the fact that gravitational acceleration is
independent of mass is responsible for our understanding in this case. In my view,
Galileo's reductio instead shows that understanding can be increased by grasping
that two factors are independent, whether by necessity or as a contingent matter. In
other words, Galileo's reduction provides understanding not by showing necessity,
but by showing a certain kind of independence.
To bring that out, consider an otherwise similar case in which we come to realize
that two seemingly related factors are in fact independent, where this independence
is a contingent matter. When we look up at the sky, the sun and the moon appear
to be almost exactly the same size. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to suspect 
as generations of astronomers did suspect  that somehow the apparent sizes of the
moon and sun are dependent upon one another, or both dependent on a third object
or feature (as when two events have a common cause). As a matter of fact, however,
these phenomena are entirely independent. The sun and the moon only appear to
23I also disagree with Lipton that Galileo's reductio enables one to understand why acceleration
must be independent of mass (Lipton, 2009, 47). In my view, Galileo's reductio provides objectual
understanding only, not also understanding-why.
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be equally sized because while the sun's diameter is approximately 400 times larger
than that of the moon, the sun is also approximately 400 times farther away from
the earth. This information gives us some understanding of the relative apparent
sizes of the sun and the moon, in that we now realize that the apparent sizes of the
moon and the sun are independent after all. In this case, it would surely have been
possible for the apparent sizes of the sun and the moon to have depended on one
another, so the independence in question is contingent (not necessary). Now, since
this example is similar in other respects to Galileo's reductio (both involve seem-
ingly dependent variables that are shown to be independent), it strongly suggests
that it is not the fact that the reductio `shows necessity' that is responsible for our
increase in understanding. Rather, our understanding increases because we come to
realize that seemingly-related factors  viz. mass and gravitational acceleration 
are independent.
These types of cases are easily accommodated by DMA, since one way in which
a dependency model of a phenomenon can be made more comprehensive is by spec-
ifying that two of its features  e.g. an object's gravitational acceleration and its
mass  do not depend on each other. By showing that an object's gravitational
acceleration is independent of its mass, we are able to model its dependency rela-
tions more comprehensively. Of course, this increase in understanding is by itself
rather modest according to DMA, since it does not tell us what factors gravitational
acceleration does depend on, only that a particular contextually salient factor, viz.
mass, is not one of these. Again, this appears to be a correct prediction, since the
understanding of gravitational acceleration provided by Galileo's reductio is indeed
rather incomplete (a point emphasized by, e.g., Khalifa, 2013b; Strevens, 2013).
Proponents of explanatory accounts have provided a number of rebuttals of Lip-
ton's argument, with Khalifa (2017, ch. 5) providing an especially detailed critique.24
It is worth noting at the outset that Khalifa's critique, like Lipton's original argu-
ment, is concerned with understanding-why rather than objectual understanding.
However, let us see if Khalifa's responses hold up against the version of the argu-
ment that I have given here (which is exclusively concerned with the latter type of
understanding  see footnotes 22 and 23). Khalifa's critique consists of two argu-
ments: First, Khalifa (2017, 138-9) argues that if the understanding brought about
by Galileo's reductio is not due to us having or grasping an explanation of some
24I will focus on Khalifa's most recent discussion (Khalifa, 2017), as opposed to a previous
discussion on which it is partly based (Khalifa, 2013b).
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sort, then Lipton lacks any resources for classifying it as genuine understanding,
since Lipton himself relies on a conception of understanding as the cognitive up-
shot of explanation. This argument is clearly not applicable to my use of Galileo's
reductio, since I do not share Lipton's explanation-based conception of what under-
standing consists in. On my view, (objectual) understanding is not the cognitive
upshot of explanation, but instead roughly the possession of a model of the under-
stood phenomenon's dependence relations (see 3 above).
Khalifa's second argument (2017, 135-8) is that even if Galileo's reductio does not
provide us with genuine understanding, it does give us what he refers to as `proto-
understanding'. Khalifa's definition of `proto-understanding' is complex (see Khalifa,
2017, 86-7 & 129), but for our purposes it suffices to say that one way in which an
agent can come to have `proto-understanding' is through obtaining information that
`plays an explanatory role' with regard to a given proposition. Importantly, however,
information can `play an explanatory role', in Khalifa's sense, without amounting to,
or even being part of, a correct explanation. Rather, it suffices that the information
in question figures in comparisons between competing potential explanations of the
relevant proposition.25 Indeed, it is crucial for Khalifa's response to Lipton that
one way for a piece of information to `play an explanatory role' with regard to a
proposition p is when it consists of justified true beliefs that potential explanations
[of p] are incorrect (Khalifa, 2017, 136). Khalifa refers to information that plays
this particular kind of role in a comparison of potential explanations as `critical
information'. Khalifa's point is then that Galileo's reductio does provide `critical
information' in this sense (and thus also `proto-understanding'), since it does rule
out some potential explanations of an object's gravitational acceleration, viz. all
those explanations in which gravitational acceleration does depend on mass.
There is an important commonality between Khalifa's treatment of Galileo's re-
ductio and that suggested by DMA. In both treatments, the central thought is that
Galileo's reductio conveys a kind of negative information, viz. that an object's ac-
celeration is not dependent on its mass. However, the two accounts characterize
this information in slightly different ways. According to Khalifa, this negative in-
formation contributes `proto-understanding' because it rules out a specific type of
explanation of gravitational acceleration. According to DMA, it contributes some
25On Khalifa's view, these comparisons are made with reference to the so-called `explanatory
virtues', e.g. simplicity and explanatory scope. Thus the comparison in question resembles that
which occurs in Inference to the Best Explanation (e.g., Harman, 1965; Lipton, 2004).
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degree of understanding because it increases the accuracy or comprehensiveness of
one's dependency model of gravitational acceleration. While this difference in how
the two accounts treat this case might seem negligible, I now want to suggest that
DMA provides a more plausible way to characterize Galileo's reductio. This is so for
two related reasons.
First, while DMA treats Galileo's reductio as providing some degree of under-
standing, Khalifa's account implies that the reductio does not provide any degree
of understanding. This might seem surprising since we have just seen how Khalifa's
account classifies the reductio as providing `proto-understanding'. However, `proto-
understanding' turns out to be compatible in Khalifa's system with lacking even a
minimal degree of understanding: Khalifa says that S has minimal understanding of
why p if and only if, for some q, S believes that q explains why p, and q explains why
p is approximately true (Khalifa, 2017, 14). By this definition, Galileo's reductio
doesn't provide minimal understanding, since the reductio doesn't require or enable
us to even conceive of an approximately true q at all; much less do we come to believe
that such a q explains why p.26 Now, since we don't have minimal understanding ac-
cording to Khalifa, we don't have any greater degree of understanding either. Hence
Khalifa's account implies that Galileo's reductio does not actually provide any de-
gree of understanding of gravitational acceleration. While I have no independent
argument for Lipton's claim that Galileo's reductio provides some understanding of
gravitational acceleration, this judgment has seemed highly intuitive and is widely
accepted (a point acknowledged by Khalifa, 2017, 138). Thus denying that we gain
even a minimal degree of understanding in this case seems to me to at least be a
cost of accepting Khalifa's treatment. By contrast, DMA implies that Galileo's re-
ductio does provide some degree of understanding, since representing gravitational
acceleration as independent of mass improves the accuracy or comprehensiveness of
the relevant dependency model.
A second reason I think my DMA-based treatment of Galileo's reductio is prefer-
able to Khalifa's concerns whether Galileo can in fact be said to have `proto-understanding'
in all relevant versions of the example. In elaborating on how his account would han-
dle Galileo's reductio, Khalifa claims that Galileo's demonstration provides critical
information [...] at the stage of comparison (Khalifa, 2017, 136-7), i.e. when one
is comparing one potential explanation to alternatives. Khalifa (2017, 135-6) argues
26Of course, we can imagine cases in which we have conceived of this q, and in which we do
believe that q explains why p, but those conditions are not part of Lipton's example.
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convincingly that this was true of the actual Galileo, who was comparing Aris-
totelian and non-Aristotelian potential explanations of gravitational acceleration.
However, in Lipton's own presentation of Galileo's reductio, there is no reference to
any comparison between alternative explanations; rather, Galileo's thought experi-
ment simply demonstrates that gravitational acceleration is independent of mass
(Lipton, 2009, 47). Contrary to what would be required for someone to have `proto-
understanding' in Khalifa's sense, there are no hypotheses or potential explanations
that are being compared in Lipton's presentation of Galileo's reductio. This points
to an important limitation to Khalifa's treatment, because it means that it is applica-
ble only to Galileo's actual argument in the Dialogue Concerning Two New Sciences
(Galilei, 1638) and not also to Lipton's (admittedly somewhat anachronistic) ver-
sion of the same argument. In so far as we agree with Lipton that we gain some
form of understanding from his presentation of the reductio as well as from Galileo's
own, Khalifa's treatment thus fails to deliver the desired verdict. By contrast, DMA
straightforwardly counts the reductio, in either Galileo's own version or in Lipton's
anachronistic version, as providing us with some degree of genuine understanding.
8 Conclusion
I have discussed three types of cases in which (objectual) understanding of a phe-
nomenon comes apart from explaining that phenomenon. These cases conflict with
my criterion for classifying accounts of understanding as explanatory, U→E. Fur-
thermore, in all these cases, the information in question does serve to increase the
accuracy and/or comprehensiveness of our models of the understood phenomenon's
dependence relations. So these cases serve double duty as positive arguments for
the dependency modeling account of understanding presented above. Although this
account is not an explanatory account of understanding, it does preserve the kernel
of truth in explanatory accounts in so far as a sufficiently accurate and comprehen-
sive dependency model contains the sort of information about a phenomenon that is
required to explain it and related phenomena, provided that they can be explained
at all. This is so for the simple reason that the dependence relations that these
models must correctly represent in order to provide understanding (e.g., causal and
grounding relations) are precisely the sort of relations that form the basis for correct
explanations.
One benefit of separating understanding from explanation in this way is that it
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enables us to identify instances of understanding without already having settled on
an account of scientific explanation. Despite being the focus of decades of intense
intellectual efforts, the nature of explanation is still highly contested and poorly
understood. Accordingly, accounts of understanding in terms of explanation run the
risk of replacing a hard question, `What is understanding?', with an even harder
question, `What is explanation?'. Of course, any account of understanding will have
to appeal to notions that could themselves be brought into question, but history
suggests that `explanation' is particularly unsuitable in this regard. By contrast,
the account of understanding I have proposed here promises to specify when, and
to what degree, someone possesses understanding in a way that doesn't rely on any
contentious account of explanation. This may, in turn, make it easier to answer
a number of important philosophical questions about understanding, such as that
regarding the value of understanding (e.g. Elgin, 2006; Kvanvig, 2009; Riggs, 2009;
Pritchard, 2010; Grimm, 2012; Ahlstrom-Vij and Grimm, 2013) and its distinctive
role in science (e.g. Bangu, 2015; Potochnik, 2015; Dellsén, 2016; Elgin, 2017).
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